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Abstract—Fabrication-less design houses outsource their de-
signs to 3rd party foundries to lower fabrication cost. However,
this creates opportunities for a rogue in the foundry to introduce
hardware Trojans, which stay inactive most of the time and
cause unintended consequences to the system when triggered.
Hardware Trojans in traditional CMOS-based circuits have
been studied and Design-for-Trust (DFT) techniques have been
proposed to detect them.
Different from traditional circuits in many ways, reversible
circuits implement one-to-one, bijective input/output mappings.
We will investigate the security implications of reversible circuits
with a particular focus on susceptibility to hardware Trojans.
We will consider inherently reversible circuits and non-reversible
functions embedded in reversible circuits.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most established computing paradigms are not reversible
including the building block operations such as NAND/NOR
that they use. While it is possible to infer the inputs when a
NAND outputs a 0 (then, both inputs are 1), it is not possible
to unambiguously infer the inputs if the NAND outputs 1.
Alternative computing paradigms are gaining interest. Re-
versible computations are bijective n-input n-output functions
that map each input combination to a unique output combina-
tion. Reversibility is useful in implementing quantum comput-
ing architectures, since quantum computations are inherently
reversible [1], [2], [3]. In fact, many components of quantum
computers such as the database in case of Grover’s Search
[4] or modular exponentiation in case of Shor’s algorithm [5])
are reversible. Hence, researchers built a reversible circuit first
(using methods e.g. reviewed in [6], [7]), which are afterwards
mapped into a corresponding quantum circuit (using methods
proposed in [2], [8]).
Besides, reversible logic continues to grow and show
promise in low power computing, [9], [10], [11], adiabatic
computing [12], circuit verification [13], and optical comput-
ing [14], [15].
Reversible circuits differ from conventional circuits in many
ways. In order to implement reversibility, fan-out and feedback
are not allowed and each circuit is realized as a cascade
of reversible gates. In this paper, we will study the supply
chain security of reversible circuits with a focus on hardware
Trojans. Effects of different types of Trojans are studied and
simple yet effective defenses are proposed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
reversible logic. Section III presents the threat model in
reversible circuits. In Section IV, we conduct studies on
small-sized hardware Trojans in reversible circuits. Based on
the characteristics of reversible circuits, simple yet effective
methods are proposed to disable inserted hardware Trojans
in Section V. Experiments on effectiveness of the proposed
methods are presented in Section VI and Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. REVIEW ON REVERSIBLE LOGIC
Definition 1. A Boolean function f : Bn → Bn is reversible
if it maps each input combination to a unique output combi-
nation.
A reversible boolean function with n inputs can be viewed
as a mapping of a Set = {0, 1, · · · , 2n − 1} to itself. A
reversible function can be represented as a truth table or a
permutation matrix as shown in Fig. 1. Each input uniquely
maps to an output and vice versa, i.e., the mapping is a
bijection.
Fig. 1. Two representations of a reversible function.
Reversible circuits synthesized from reversible functions
typically are cascades of reversible gates. In addition to
components that are naturally reversible such as wire, Not,
and Swap gates, Fredkin, Toffoli and Feynman are frequently
used in the reversible/quantum computing literature [16].
Definition 2. A k input, k output gate is reversible if it realizes
a reversible function.
Toffoli gate will be considered in this paper. A k-input
Toffoli gate has k − 1 control lines and 1 target line, where
the control lines can be either positive or negative.
Definition 3. A k × k Toffoli gate passes k-1 control lines
unchanged, and inverts the target line if values of all its
positive (negative) control lines are 1 (0).
For simplicity, only positive control lines are consid-
ered in this paper. Consider the general Toffoli gate
TOFk(x1, x2, · · · , xk) = (x
′
1, x
′
2, · · · , x
′
k) where the k
th line
is the target line, then
x′i = xi(i < k),
x′k = x1x2 · · ·xk−1 ⊕ xk.
TOF1(x1) is a NOT gate, and TOF2(x1, x2) is a controlled-
NOT gate (CNOT). Symbols of TOF1(x1), TOF2(x1, x2)
and TOF3(x1, x2, x3) are shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Example reversible gates. (a) NOT, (b) C-NOT, (3) Toffoli.
Arbitrary functions can be implemented as reversible cir-
cuits as cascades of reversible gates. Many approaches have
been proposed to synthesize reversible circuits [17], [18], [19],
[20], [21], [22], [23]. Ancillary inputs and garbage outputs
are necessary when embedding non-reversible function into a
reversible structure.
Fig. 3. Truth table and permutation matrix of a half adder.
Example 1. The half adder truth table is shown in Fig. 3(a).
Input combinations 01 and 10 map to the same output 01.
Fig. 3(b) shows its permutation matrix. Non-reversibility can
be seen in the second row (output 01) of the matrix, which
has two 1s in the row. The entries in the second and third
columns represent input combinations 01 and 10. All 0s in the
last row of the matrix violates reversibility, because no input
combination is mapped to this output 11.
To make the half adder reversible, the first step is to add
garbage output(s) to make sure each input pattern has a
corresponding unique output pattern. In a half adder, there are
two input patterns that map to one output pattern, so adding
one garbage output bit is enough to create a unique input-
output mapping. Next, we should make sure that the number
of inputs and the number of outputs are equal. One ancillary
(constant) input is added to make the number of inputs and
TABLE I
EMBEDDING THE HALF ADDER.
(a) Adding ancillary inputs and
garbage outputs
x y a x′ y′ g
0 0 0 0 0 *
0 0 1 · · ·
0 1 0 0 1 *
0 1 1 · · ·
1 0 0 0 1 *
1 0 1 · · ·
1 1 0 1 0 *
1 1 1 · · ·
(b) One possible embedding
x y a x′ y′ g
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
outputs same, as shown in TABLE I(a). Any assignment to
the garbage output g and the ancillary input a is a valid
assignment as long as it creates a reversible function. Most
prior work assigned constant values to ancillary inputs as
shown in TABLE I(b).
III. THE THREAT MODEL
A. Hardware Trojans
Globalization of the integrated circuit (IC) design flow has
raised security concerns including malicious circuit modifi-
cations, referred as Hardware Trojans. A hardware Trojan
remains inactive and poses no threat to its host circuit until it
is triggered. When triggered it will alter the original function
[24], [25]. Hardware Trojans are hard to detect since they are
stealthy: 1) they are designed to be triggered under extremely
rare conditions and 2) they are usually much smaller than
their host circuits. Various Design-for-Trust techniques have
been developed to detect and prevent hardware Trojans and/or
recover from faults created by them [26], [27]. One set of
techniques increase the switching probability of the normally
inactive nets and hence facilitating the triggering and detecting
processes [28]. Another set of techniques detect hardware
Trojans by enhancing and monitoring the side-channel effects
[29], [30], [31]. However, all of these techniques focus on
CMOS-based designs that are inherently non-reversible.
B. Trojans vs. Faults in Reversible Logic
Hardware Trojans are to some extent similar to faults as
they all affect the outputs when triggered. Extending from this
point, a hardware Trojan may be categorized as a new type
of faults where the host circuit contains extra gates. However,
the key difference between faults and hardware Trojans is their
origins: Faults originate from imperfect fabrication process or
environment disturbance, while hardware Trojans are well-
designed and carefully inserted by attackers with a detailed
knowledge of the host circuit. From the point of circuit testing,
a common practice is to focus on a limited set of fault models
and assume a single-gate failure [32], [33], [34], [35]. On the
other hand, the size, structure, and functionality of a Trojan
can be unknown and unforeseeable, which makes test patterns
for Trojan detection much harder to generate.
Further, the excellent controllability and reversibility of
reversible circuits makes testing for faults much easier. In a
reversible circuit, reversibility exists not only between primary
inputs and primary outputs but also between inputs and outputs
of any internal gates. The inputs to any internal gate can
be controlled easily from the primary inputs and the outputs
of any internal gate can be observed at the primary outputs.
The excellent controllability and reversibility, however, benefit
Trojan attackers as well. This is because all the nodes will have
the same switching probability if random inputs are applied.
As a result, a Trojan can be inserted at any position in a
reversible circuit and receive the same triggering probability,
which significantly increases the search space for detection.
This is not the case in CMOS-based circuits where the
switching probabilities of nodes vary significantly and inactive
nodes are considered the best candidates for Trojan insertion
[28].
C. The Threat Model
Consider an attacker in the foundry who tries to insert a
hardware Trojan during fabrication. The Trojan impacts the
output of the host design when triggered. Fig. 4 shows the
supply chain of integrated circuits.
Fig. 4. The IC design flow. The attacker is in the foundry.
The Trojan can be a simple k-Toffoli gate or complex one
consisting of multiple k-Toffoli gates. k can be different values
for different gates. The hardware Trojan maintains reversibility
since it uses Toffoli gates.
IV. HARDWARE TROJANS IN REVERSIBLE CIRCUITS
Small hardware Trojans are always favored due to their
minimal side-channel impacts on the host circuit including
power, dimensions and delay. We start our analysis from small-
sized Trojans to a general case.
A. Single-Gate Trojans
Consider a reversible circuit with n primary inputs/outputs
and a k-Toffoli Trojan gate. This Trojan will pass its input
unchanged if at least one of its control lines is set to 0 and
will affect the original circuit function when it is triggered,
i.e., when all its control lines are set to 1.
Theorem 1. A single-gate Trojan in a reversible circuit can
be activated by at least two input patterns.
Proof. When the Trojan consists of n-1 control lines and 1
target line, it can be triggered by assigning each control line
to 1, and the target line to either 1 or 0. So there are two
input patterns that can activate the Trojan. When the number
of control lines is k − 1 (k ≤ n), there are 2n−k+1 patterns
that can trigger the Trojan. As a result, there are at least 2
patterns that can activate the Trojan.
Since the tester does not know which line will be the target
line in the Trojan, between the two triggering patterns, the
pattern that applies 1 to all lines is more effective in detecting
a single-gate Trojan. The pattern, which needs to apply 0 to
the target line of a Trojan, is less effective since the tester must
try out all n lines to guarantee the triggering. This results in
the a set of one-cold patterns where each of the n inputs takes
turn to be 0. We hence refer the former as the All-1 pattern,
and the latter as the set of One-Cold patterns. According to
the following analysis, the All-1 pattern is more efficient in
triggering a single-gate Trojan, while the set of One-Cold
patterns are useful in triggering any Trojans consisting of 4
gates.
The ALL-1 pattern: Since most of the times a Trojan is
inserted somewhere in the middle of the circuit as shown in
Fig. 5, applying an All-1 triggering pattern at A and observing
the error at output are necessary.
Fig. 5. Reversible circuit with Trojan insertion.
Theorem 2. It is sufficient to apply at most m + 1 patterns
at I to trigger a single-gate Trojan inserted at ANY position
in an m-gate reversible circuit, and observe the Trojan effects
at O.
Proof. Controllability: In order to apply the All-1 pattern at
Trojan input A, the tester needs to find the corresponding
pattern at circuit input I . Luckily, due to the reversibility of
the circuit and each sub-circuit (like Part 1 in the figure), there
is always a pattern at I that maps to the triggering pattern at
A.
Observability: Also due to the reversibility of Part 2, the
effect induced by a triggered Trojan will always propagate an
unexpected output observed at O.
The number of patterns: The pattern at I , however, depends
on the function of Part 1 in Fig. 5, which in turn depends
on the position of the Trojan. Since in an m-gate reversible
host circuit there are m + 1 positions for inserting a Trojan,
a m+ 1 input patterns at I will guarantee the triggering of a
single-gate Trojan inserted at ANY position.
These m+1 input patterns are sufficient to detect a single-
gate Trojan.
For easy reference, we still use the All-1 pattern (at A) to
represent the m+ 1 patterns at I .
One-Cold Patterns:
Theorem 3. It is sufficient to apply at most n × (m + 1)
patterns at I to trigger a single-gate Trojan inserted at ANY
position in a m-gate reversible circuit, and observe its effect
at O.
The proof is similar to Theorem 2. Since each set of One-
Cold patterns consists of n patterns for an n-line reversible
circuit, the total number of inputs patterns that guarantee the
detection of any single-gate Trojan is n× (m+1). Similar to
the All-1 pattern, we use the set of One-Cold patterns at A to
represent the n× (m+ 1) patterns at I .
B. Two-Gate Trojans
For a two-gate Trojan, 2 cases arise.
Case 1: The two gates have different target lines as shown
in Fig. 6(a). Triggering one of the gates triggers the Trojan.
Both the All-1 pattern and the set of One-Cold patterns can
detect such two-gate Trojans. Thus, detection of this two-gate
Trojan only needs partial triggering.
Fig. 6. Two-gate Trojan. (a) Two gates have different target lines; (b) Two
gates have the same target line but different control lines.
Case 2: The two gates have the same target line but different
control lines, as shown in Fig. 6(b).
Theorem 4. At least one pattern from the set of One-Cold
patterns can detect the two-gate Trojan in Case 2 where both
gates control the same target line.
Proof. Since the two gates have different control lines, there
is at least one One-Cold pattern among the set of n patterns
that will trigger only one of the two gates, i.e., the only 0
is applied to a control line of the other gate. Since the other
gate is not triggered, the effect induced by the triggered gate
can always be passed through the down stream sub-circuit to
output O, which leads to its detection.
The All-1 pattern always trigger both gates. Since these two
gates control the same target line, this target line will start from
1 and is inverted to 0 by the first gate, then inverted back to
1 by the second gate.
Note that there is a third case where both gates have the
same control lines and control the same target line. This is
a dummy case since both gates are either not triggered or
triggered but the second gate always cancels the effect induced
by the first gate. While this Trojan may still affect the host’s
side-channel parameters, we will leave them for future work.
C. Three-Gate Trojans
For a three-gate Trojan, 5 cases are illustrated in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. All possible three-gate Trojans.
Case 1: Three gates control the same target line shown
in Fig. 7(a). Consider the All-1 pattern at A and the One-
Cold pattern at A where the 0 bit is on the target line. Both
patterns will trigger all three gates and the target line will be
inverted three times and end up being 0 or 1, respectively.
This will result in an unexpected output and hence the Trojan
is detected.
Case 2: The former two gates control the same target line.
Triggering the third gate or triggering one of the former two
gates will guarantee detection of the Trojan. The third gate is
triggered by the All-1 pattern at A or by the One-Cold pattern
where the 0 bit is on its target line as shown in Fig. 7(b).
When the former two gates have different control lines, one
of them can be triggered by applying One-Cold patterns; this
is Case 2 of 2-gate Trojans. When they have the same control
lines, we can ignore them as mentioned in Case 3 of 2-gate
Trojans.
Case 3: The last two gates control the same target line as
shown in Fig. 7(c). Triggering the first gate will detect of the
Trojan. Both the All-1 input pattern and the One-Cold input
pattern at A where the 0 bit is on the target line of the first
gate will trigger it.
Case 4: The first and the last gates have the same target
line as shown in Fig. 7(d). This forms a symmetric structure;
effects brought by the first gate will be canceled by the third
gate when the middle gate is not triggered. The question then
is if the middle gate is guaranteed to be detected by using
either the All-1 pattern or the set of One-Cold patterns. The
answer is yes. Consider a One-Cold pattern at A (which is
also the input to the first gate) where the 0 bit is on the target
line of the first gate. Since all the other bits are 1, the first
gate is triggered and its target line flips 0 → 1. This results
in an All-1 pattern at the input of the middle gate triggering
it. The All-1 pattern at A will not guarantee triggering of the
middle gate. This is because the 1 on the target line of the
first gate is inverted to 0 and this 0 may happen to be on the
control line of the middle gate.
Case 5: All 3 gates control different target lines as shown
in Fig. 7(e). Triggering any of these gates is enough to detect
the Trojan and this can be achieved by either the All-1 pattern
or the set of One-Cold patterns.
In summary, the set of One-Cold patterns guarantee the
detection of any 3-gate Trojans inserted at any position of
the host circuit.
D. Four-Gate Trojans
One can similarly conclude that the set of One-Cold patterns
guarantees the detection of any 4-gate Trojan inserted at any
place in the host circuit.
E. Symmetric Trojans
For a Trojan with more than four gates, a sophisticated
attacker may hide the impact of input patterns with symmetric
parts as shown in Fig. 8(a). Unfortunately, neither the All-1
pattern nor the set of One-Cold patterns guarantees detection
of such a Trojan.
In Fig. 8(a), a symmetric Trojan is represented as tT t−1,
where t, T and t−1 are the left, middle and the right part of
the symmetric Trojan. The symmetric parts, t and t−1, have
at least two gates each and have the same set of control lines.
They will be triggered by the same set of patterns and control
the same set of target lines. The triggering of the symmetric
parts t and t−1 does not impact the output of the host circuit.
Thus such symmetric Trojans can be detected by triggering T .
However, both patterns fail to do so.
• When the All-1 pattern arrives at A, t will be triggered
and its target lines will be inverted to 0s. Since t’s target
lines are the control lines to T , T won’t be able to see
all 1s at its input and will remain inactive.
• If the set of One-Cold patterns are applied at A, since
there is only one 0 bit in the pattern, at most one of the
t’s target lines will be inverted to 1. T won’t see all 1s
at its input either and will remain inactive.
Fig. 8(b) shows how to trigger T . The triggering of T
requires the input pattern in level 3 to be < 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 >
or < 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 >. If we want to apply < 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 > in
level 3, the input pattern in level 2 has to be < 0, 0, 1, 1, 1 >
when the 2nd gate is triggered (solid line) or < 0, 1, 1, 1, 1 >
when the 2nd gate is not triggered (dotted line). The remaining
steps are similarly derived. Each path in the diagram indicates
at least one design of a symmetric Trojan. And each leaf of a
path represents the pattern that arrives at the Trojan and can
eventually activate T part.
As the All-1 and the set of One-Cold patterns cannot
guarantee the detection of symmetric patterns, we propose to
thwarting hardware Trojans by disabling them in the functional
mode. The next section presents the proposed technique.
Fig. 8. Symmetric Trojans. (a) Trojan circuit consists of tT t−1 ; (b) The
triggering diagram for T ; solid and dotted lines represent gates triggered and
not triggered respectively. The control lines of t and t′ are not shown in the
figure.
V. DETECTING AND THWARTING TROJANS IN REVERSIBLE
CIRCUITS
A. Generalizing to Arbitrary Trojans
According to the principle of reversibility in Fig. 5, a
primary input pattern < i1, i2, · · · , in > maps correctly to
a primary output pattern < o1, o2, · · · , on > only if the
corresponding intermediate result < a1, a2, · · · , an > is the
same as < b1, b2, · · · , bn >, i.e., the Trojan passes its input
unchanged. Primary input patterns that make an inconsistent
mapping between < a1, a2, · · · , an > and < b1, b2, · · · , bn >
trigger the Trojan, resulting in unexpected primary outputs.
Since a Trojan is reversible by itself, the size of its truth table
is the same as its host circuit. A Trojan should not be triggered
for all the entries in its truth table where the input equals the
output (equal I/O pairs).
We can use D = Num(equal I/O pairs)Num(all I/O pairs) ≤ 1 to represent the
difficulty of triggering a Trojan. The larger the D, the more
difficult it is to detect/trigger the Trojan when random patterns
are applied.
Fig. 9 shows reversible circuits with a Trojan gate in dotted
rectangle. In Fig. 9(a), the Trojan gate has a single control
and target line. When the control line is set to 1, the Trojan
is activated and D = 0.5. In Fig. 9(b), the Trojan gate has 2
control lines and 1 target line. It will be activated only when
both its control lines receive 1. This translates to 6-out-of-8
I/O pairs and results in D = 0.75. The truth tables of the two
Trojans are shown in Fig. 9(c), where triggering I/O pairs are
in bold.
Fig. 9. Reversible circuits with an arbitrary Trojan gate in dotted rectangle.
B. Detecting Trojans in Reversible Circuits w/o Ancillary
Inputs
In inherently reversible circuits, the probability that each
line is a 1 (or 0) is 0.5. Hence applying random test patterns
at primary inputs can be a basic detection method since
the randomness at the primary inputs will be passed to the
Trojan’s input no matter where it is inserted. Hence the
difficulty/chance of detecting a random Trojan in inherently
reversible circuits is directly related to the D of this Trojan.
C. Detecting Trojans in Reversible Circuits w/ Ancillary In-
puts
Non-reversible functions, such as add and multiply, can be
embedded into a reversible circuit. This is a more popular
case since most functions are not reversible. The embedding
process first adds garbage outputs to map each possible input
to a unique output, and then adds ancillary inputs to make the
number of inputs equal to the number of outputs. Ancillary
inputs can be assigned random values just like primary inputs
when the reversible circuit is under testing and assigned a
constant value (0 or 1) in the functional mode.
Let us use the half adder example. The truth table of a half
adder embedded in a reversible circuit is shown in TABLE
I(b). In the test mode, all entries of the truth table can be
exercised. In the functional mode, only the bold entries are
visited. If a triggering pattern of a Trojan is one of these never-
reached entries, it will never be received by the Trojan in
the functional mode. If all triggering patterns of a Trojan are
the never-reached entries, the Trojan is never triggered in the
functional mode. This is illustrated in Fig. 10. Each gate is
annotated with its triggering probability. The ancillary inputs
result in a 0 triggering probability of the fourth gate in Fig.
10(b).
This property presents a dilemma to a Trojan designer.
On one hand, to avoid being triggered and hence detected
in the test mode where all inputs, including both primary
and ancillary inputs could be exercised for testing, Trojan
designers have to minimize the number of patterns that
can trigger their Trojans. That is, make D close to 1.
On the other hand, the less the number of triggering
patterns, the higher the chance they are never exercised
in the functional mode where ancillary inputs will only
take fixed values. This can be exploited by the designers of
host circuits to (partially or completely) disable Trojans in the
functional mode.
Fig. 10. Triggering a Trojan in reversible circuits (a) without ancillary inputs
and (b) with ancillary inputs.
D. Scramble Inputs and Outputs to Thwart Trojans
Consider scrambling of inputs. The scrambling can be
achieved in two ways. First, one can scramble the inputs to
the original function by exploiting the existing ancillary inputs.
Second, introduce ancillary inputs to improve scrambling. The
designer scrambles in the design phase and keeps it secret from
the foundry, as shown in Fig. 11. Only authorized users obtain
and use the scrambling code (the assignments to ancillary
inputs).
Fig. 11. Designer scrambles I/O pairs through ancillary inputs.
1) Exploit Ancillary Inputs: For simplicity, ancillary inputs
are usually assigned all 0 or all 1 during functional mode. The
truth table of decod24 10 with two ancillary inputs being 0 is
shown in TABLE II(a). This assignment is easy to crack by
an attacker since only two guesses are necessary. Scrambling
can be more sophisticated, since the ancillary inputs do not
have to be a fixed constants. They can be designed to take
any values in the functional mode, as long as the resulting
truth table is reversible.
TABLE II
ASSIGNMENTS OF ANCILLARY INPUTS OF decod 24 10.
(a) The assignment of all an-
cillary inputs being 0
x1x2a1a2 y1y2y3y4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
(b) The assignment of half of
ancillary inputs being 0
x1x2a1a2 y1y2y3y4
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
(c) The assignment of random
ancillary inputs
x1x2a1a2 y1y2y3y4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 01 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Starting with a reversible circuit with p primary inputs and
c ancillary inputs that take all 0 (or all 1) for all primary input
patterns, the first thing we can do is to make some of the
ancillary inputs 0 and the rest 1. One example is shown in
TABLE II(b). The number of guesses for the values taken by
ancillary inputs will increase up to 2c.
To further decrease successful guessing, the values of ancil-
lary inputs can be randomly chosen for each input pattern, as
long as these input patterns map to correct output patterns. One
example is shown in TABLE II(c). This makes the number of
guesses up to 2p+c. Additional ancillary inputs can be added
to improve scrambling, at extra cost.
2) Probability that a Trojan is Never Triggered: Assume
a p-input non-reversible function is embedded to a n-input
reversible circuit with c ancillary inputs (n = p + c). The
attacker sees a circuit whose truth table has 2n = 2p+c entries.
He then designs a Trojan that has t triggering patterns. t
is chosen to be small enough to pass testing using random
patterns picked from total 2p+c patterns. However, during
functional mode, all or part of the t patterns may never be
reached. The probability is calculated as follows.
• the probability that no input patterns trigger the Trojan is
(2
p
0 )(
2p+c−2p
t )
(2
p+c
t )
, i.e., all t patterns are never reached.
• the probability that 1 input pattern triggers the Trojan is
(2
p
1 )∗(
2p+c−2p
t−1 )
(2
p+c
t )
, i.e., other t−1 patterns are never reached.
• the probability that 2 input patterns trigger the Trojan is
(2
p
2 )∗(
2p+c−2p
t−2 )
(2
p+c
t )
;
• · · ·
• the probability that i input patterns trigger the Trojan is
(2
p
i )∗(
2p+c−2p
t−i )
(2
p+c
t )
;
Fig. 12 illustrates the effect of ancillary inputs on triggering
a Trojan. The number of patterns that can trigger the Trojan
is set to t = 8. The number of primary inputs and ancillary
inputs is varied from 3 to 20 and from 1 to 20, respectively.
The probability that the Trojan is never triggered is ∼ 0
when there are few ancillary inputs no matter the number of
primary inputs. A Trojan in a reversible circuit can always
be triggered in such a situation. However, this probability
increases exponentially with the number of ancillary inputs.
A small number of ancillary inputs can disable triggering
a Trojan with a very high probability. As a result, extra
ancillary inputs can protect the host from Trojan even when
there are insufficient number of ancillary inputs created during
embedding.
Fig. 12. The probability that a Trojan is never triggered as a function the
number of primary inputs and ancillary inputs.
VI. EXPERIMENTS
The experiments use the QMDD synthesis approach that
takes as input a reversible truth table, outputs its implemen-
tation in reversible logic, and reports the cost [23], [36].
Benchmark circuits are taken from revlib [37]. The scrambling
technique in Section V is partitioned into several levels,
including all ancillary inputs being 0 (baseline), half ancillary
inputs being 0 and the other half being 1 (Lv1), random
ancillary inputs for each primary input pattern (Lv2), and
adding extra 1 ancillary input (Lv3).
To have a fair comparison on the probability of disabling
Trojans across different scrambling levels, the study is carried
on the Trojans that have only 1 triggering pattern. The Trojans
with this assumption always have a minimum probability being
detected in the test mode, which is favored by the attacker.
Assuming random inputs patterns are applied, we can then
calculate the probability of such Trojans being disabled in
the functional mode. Since scrambling levels baseline, Lv1
and Lv2 have the same number of ancillary inputs, they have
the same probability of disabling same Trojans. After adding
an extra ancillary input, the probability will be improved.
Experimental results of baseline − Lv2, Lv3 are shown in
TABLE III.
From TABLE III, we can observe that, without adding any
extra ancillary inputs, all benchmarks have at least 50% chance
of disabling the Trojans that have just 1 triggering pattern.
Some benchmarks are even close to 100%. With one more
extra ancillary inputs, the probability is always higher. This
is great in thwarting Trojans in reversible circuits since the
attackers may need to re-evaluate the trade-off between the
great risk they will bear by inserting these Trojans and the
usefulness of these Trojans.
TABLE III
THE PROBABILITY THAT THE TROJAN IS DISABLED IN THE FUNCTIONAL
MODE.
Benchmark Total inputs constants
Probability of being disabled (%)
Baseline-Lv2 Lv3
decod24 10 4 2 75.0 87.5
4gt12 24 5 1 50.0 75.0
decod24 32 6 3 87.5 93.8
f2 158 7 3 87.5 93.8
rd53 68 7 2 75.0 87.5
rd73 69 9 2 75.0 87.5
sqn 203 9 2 75.0 87.5
squar5 206 9 4 93.8 96.9
wim 220 9 5 96.9 98.4
dc1 142 10 6 98.4 99.2
dist 144 10 2 75.0 87.5
root 197 10 2 75.0 87.5
clip 124 11 2 75.0 87.5
rd84 70 11 3 87.5 93.8
sqr6 204 12 6 98.4 99.2
cm42a 125 13 9 99.8 99.9
dc2 143 13 5 96.9 98.4
mlp4 184 13 5 96.9 98.4
pm1 192 13 9 99.8 99.9
alu2 96 14 4 93.8 96.9
alu3 97 14 4 93.8 96.9
example2 156 14 4 93.8 96.9
inc 170 14 7 99.2 99.6
misex1 178 14 6 98.4 99.2
sao2 199 14 4 93.8 96.9
co14 135 15 1 50.0 75.0
dk27 146 15 6 98.4 99.2
x2 223 16 6 98.4 99.2
t481 208 17 1 50.0 75.0
Average 85.8 92.9
The overhead of all scrambling levels is also evaluated for
each benchmark circuit in terms of the number of lines (Line
Cost), the number of gates (Gate Cost) and the number of
primitive reversible logic gates (1*1, 2*2) required to realize
the circuit (Quantum Cost). A Toffoli gate may consist of
several primitive reversible logic gates, so the quantum cost is
several times larger than the gate cost. The overhead of each
scrambling level (Lv1− 3) is compared against the baseline.
For reversible circuits that only have 1 ancillary input, the
overhead of Lv1 is not calculated in Table IV.
It is observed that for the scrambling levels that has no extra
ancillary input (baseline-Lv2), the line cost is always 0. For
the scrambling levels that have extra ancillary input(s) (Lv3),
the line cost presents, but the relative overhead decreases with
the scale of benchmark circuits.
Besides, Lv2 has maximum average gate cost and quantum
cost compared to other scrambling levels. This is because,
assigning random ancillary inputs for each input pattern forms
a most complex function, which will need more gates to realize
it. As a result, for both security- and gate/quantum cost-aware
designs, introducing extra ancillary inputs can be a substitution
for further improving scrambling levels with less gate/quantum
cost while at extra line cost. It is also observed the gate cost
and quantum cost increase significantly for some designs. This
is partially because the state-of-art synthesis algorithm is still
on its early stage where obtaining a valid implementation is
still the primary goal.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As the circuit designer has a good knowledge of all gates
in reversible circuits, any missing control/gate fault caused
by imperfect fabrication is easy to detect through test pattern
generation. Compared to existing fault models, deliberately
designed and inserted Trojans are sophisticated and unpre-
dictable, and hence more difficult to detect and counter.
Our investigation shows that, by exploiting the inherent
reversibility of these circuits, a set of predefined test patterns
can trigger (and hence detect) any Trojan up-to 4 gates in size
inserted at any position in the host circuit. The attacker is
forced to insert symmetric Trojans that have 5 or more gates.
We propose to scramble inputs to thwart such Trojans in the
functional mode of host circuits. The inputs to the circuit are
scrambled by assigning secret values to the ancillary inputs
and introducing extra ancillary inputs. Without knowing these
secret values and extra ancillary inputs, a Trojan designer has
to risk an increased chance that the Trojan may never be
triggered during circuit functional mode, which invalidates his
original motivation.
A. Discussion and Future Work
It is observed in the experiments that the overhead varies
significantly for benchmark circuits within the same scram-
bling level or for the same circuits at different scrambling
levels. That is, the increase of overhead (in terms of gate cost
or quantum cost) from baseline to Lv3 are not in a fixed
relation. This is because, the current synthesis approaches do
not take the scrambling technique into consideration. Thus de-
veloping an overhead- and security-aware synthesis approach
will be an important future work.
Besides, this work only considers hardware Trojans that
consist of consecutive gates. However, an attacker may design
a Trojan that has several distributed parts and each part may
consist of multiple gates. The investigation of this kind of
Trojan in reversible circuits will also be a part of future work.
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